Interdisciplinary Studies of Complex Systems
No. 28 (2026) 18–31
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https://doi.org/10.31392/iscs.2026.28.018 UDC 141.319.8: 572.026

Human integrity in the context of approaching technological singularity

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Abstract. *Purpose.* Under the conditions of the development of the artificial intelligence, the problem of the structure disintegration in the society of modernity has become more sensitive and acute. The potential onset of the technological singularity can raise the question of both new differentiation of humanity and its possible disintegration, Therefore, it is relevant to formulate new grounds for the integrity of an individual , in general, and an individual as a representative of the society, in particular.
Theoretical basis. The theoretical base of the study is the exposure of contradictions ,which have been forming during the crises of the human integrity. In this reseach, the use of the principles of systematization, the methods of analogy and of conceivable experiments, the,comparison of mimetic and analytical approaches, the principles of the unity of the historical and the logical are represented. The general artificial intelligence is perceived as a potential technogenic subject that occupies the position of the Other in relation to human beings.
Scientific novelty. The author has investigated the foundations of human integrity, which are based on understanding human history as a separate stage in the development of intelligible subjects. It is shown that the period of history from the beginning of the use of tools by humans up to the technological singularity can be presented as the pivotal time for future generations of people who could retain their anthropomorphism. It is also shown that the human individual has a set of properties that can preserve his/her relevance as a model of intellectual development for technosubjects, that is post-anthropic human beings.
Conclusions. The foundations of the post-singular human integrity can be divided into two components. A) Those functions which a person has being used, and which will ensure their integrity, just as an ecological niche ensures the integrity of the biological species that exists within it. The general AI as an individual subject will not be able to fully know itself, to have full limits of anthropomorphism, which make it necessary not only to analyse but also to partially copy human behaviour. B) The human beings will likely retain their significance as a benchmark for psychophysical problems and as a benchmark for the development of intelligence, in which the individuality achieves relative harmony with subjectivity cycles of human personality reproduction, which will be based on the culture of human beings during the axial age. The refusal to compare oneself with the problems and values of the axial age can either lead to the cultural degradation of the anthropomorphic human being, who will effectively become a savage, even more vulnerable to the influence of technosubjects, or to the transformation of human subjectivity, the transformation into a human-machine symbiont, in which the human component consciously shuns completely independent decision-making process.

Keywords: human subjuctivity; artificial intelligence; technosubject; challenges , human values; technological singularity

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Introduction

General artificial intelligence, the very possibility of which has been denied for many years and has not accepted by some sceptics yet also poses a challenge to human integrity among many other challenges.

The development of the modernity was largely based on overcoming crises through the formation of the new ideals of society and humanity. In the process of achieving these ideals, it was possible to partially overcome previous socio-economic crises and achieve some positive results. But the accumulation of the negative consequences required a change in the vector of the development, some new approaches to its estimation because the image of the "ideal" human being, as it has been embodied is revealing more and more internal conflicts and obvious shortcomings. This has led reserchers to the image of the axial age, not only concerning the period identified by Karl Jaspers, but to understanding it more broadly, as the sum of those periods when the foundations were laid for the image of man that the contemporaries perceived as the most humanistic one.

However, one of the signs of the ongoing crisis of the modernity can be presumably called the crisis of the ideal man in the contemporary philosophic anthropology.

The first obvious challenge to this ideal is known to be the development of the concept of the death of the subject.

The scientists maintain that this concept is represented by two directions.

The first direction proclaims the death of the subject in the tradition of the anthropo- phychology. The cartesian subject with his/her position as the center of cognition has been called under question. Jacques Lacan's statement, "Where I think, I do not exist, and where I exist, I do not think," has found its followers. For example, Slavoj Žižek, reflecting the involvement of the modern individual in electronic media, writes not about interactivity, but about the interpassivity of the subject: "Is not the necessary obverse of my interacting with the object instead of just passively following the show the situation in which the object itself takes from me, deprives me of, my own passive reaction of satisfaction (or mourning or laughter), so that it is the object itself which "enjoys the show" instead of me, relieving me of the superego duty to enjoy myself? Do we not witness "interpassivity" in a great number of today's publicity spots or posters which, as it were, passively enjoy the product instead of us? (Coke cans containing the inscription "Ooh! Oohl What taste" emulate the ideal customer's reaction in advance.)" [16, P. 144–145]. But the blurring of the self-reflective personality as the most important instance of choice cannot go on indefinitely. When psychoanalytic models are taken to extremes, there is a rejection of free will, of formulating and making decisions. Consequently, such individuals cannot exist in the society; their actions contradict the argument put forward by Immanuel Kant: if a human being was deprived of free will, it would be impossible to judge criminals.

The second direction leads the "death of the subject" in the tradition of M. Foucault, who proclaimed the incompatibility of a person, his/her personality, their capabilities with socio-economic processes in the society. But this position, by its own , is also very vulnerable to criticism because of its futility.

It is true that an economic formation can accumulate internal contradictions that lead to contradictions in society and contradictions in the worldview of an individual. But if we directly extrapolate the trends, we arrive at the impossibility of the development of the civilization. M. Hardt and A. Negri oppose globalisation to the lower self-organisation of society: "Subjectivity, in other worlds, is produced through cooperation and communication. Wich in turn produce new subjectivity, and so forth... Perhaps in this process of metamorphosis and constitution we should recognize the formation of the body of the multitude, a fundamentally new kind of body, a common all forms of being for the simple sense of having" [7, P. 189]. This position seems a flattering one to an average person, but it calls into question the maintenance of the infrastructure in large cities, which requires tax collection, et cetera. And although the authors are aware of this problem, they have not formulated any solution to it yet.

Srnicek and Williams express themselves even more radically: "A twenty-fi rst-century left must seek to combat the centrality of work to contemporary life. In the end, our choice is between glorifying work and the working class or abolishing them both." [14, P. 126]. This position is also unacceptable: reducing all activity to human self-realisation, which does not require any volitional effort, i.e. the rejection of work, even to oneself, will in fact lead to the infantilisation of the individual.

The second challenge to the perception of man in the contemporary philosophical anthropology are considered transhumanism and posthumanism.

Transhumanism, which arose from the permanent postmodern differences in understanding taking man, directly expresses an alternative to the traditional anthropomorphism: it is a path to the constant improvement of an individual through the transformation of his/her body and mind. But this challenge undermines the biological unity of humanity: "Dark Enlightenment" is a collective name for the philosophical and political movement (N. Land, K. Jarvin), whose representatives explicitly stated that the genetic transformation of human beings is inevitable as a form of the acceleration of evoluyion [10].

However, attempts to formulate ethical arguments against the development of biotechnology are often either subjective or inner contradictory. For example, F. Fukuyama, arguing against unnecessary interference with the human genome and phenotype, argues: "One obvious way to draw red lines is to distinguish between therapy and enhancement, directing research toward the former while putting restrictions on the latter... While it is the case that certain conditions do not lend themselves to neat distinctions between pathological and normal, it is also true that there is such a thing as health. As Leon Kass has argued, there is a natural functioning to the whole organism that has been determined by the requirements of the species' evolutionary history, one that is not simply an arbitrary social construction." [4, P. 206–207]. But the history of the evolution of a biological species can be continued, as transhumanists put it: if with the help of intervention in the genetic code, the life span of the average person is doubled, will this be the preservation of health or a change in the norm?

"The posthumanist perspective rests on the assumption of the historical decline of Humanism but goes further in exploring alternatives, without sinking

into the rhetoric of the crisis of Man. It works instead towards elaborating alternative ways of conceptualizing the human subject.",— asserts [1, P. 37]. But the most productive concept of an alternative subject in posthumanism has been the image of artificial intelligence, with the main futurological assumption being not just the image of general AI acquiring the properties of a subject, but the advent of technological singularity, which in fact means humanity's loss of control over the development of civilisation. Therefore, the progressivism of the last century is gradually being replaced by images of competition between the human and the technological. "Humans will lose their economic and military usefulness, hence the economic and political system will stop attaching much value to them. 2. The system will still find value in humans collectively, but not in unique individuals. 3. The system will still find value in some unique individuals, but these will be a new elite of upgraded superhumans rather than the mass of the population." [6, P. 181]. Though Yuval Noah Harari's fears are rational, he reduces humans to economic and military functionality, which is not always true.

In general, the possibility of creating post-humans is not excluded, but post-humans are fundamentally different from humans, and they are not the subject of this article.

However, we can note a discrepancy between the two main challenges in understanding humans described above: between the complete destruction of the subject under the influence of the growing complexity of civilisation (in the followers of Lacan's and Foucault's philosophy) and its technogenic transformation (in trans- and posthumanists). The very possibility of the technogenic Other as a non-human subject suggests that human nature and civilisation in all their completeness could not be identical. Therefore, it is possible to consider the human race outside of the maximum unity with the technogenic civilisation. This raises the question: how can we resist the marginalisation of humans and the constant blurring of ideas about them, assuming the very possibility of creating a universal AI that will take over the control of civilisation?

One possible answer may be a holistic view of the human race, which must be preserved regardless the future level of the technological development.

Purpose

The development of AI technologies and the probable approach of technological singularity present people with a difficult problem: either to renounce anthropomorphism, or to drastically reduce their connection with civilisation, reverting it to a state of barbarism and savagery, or—as a third possibility—to seek new foundations for their integrity as individuals and members of society.

The purpose of this article is to find the foundations of human integrity that will become relevant as the event of the creation of the universal AI.

Presentation of the main material

"When it is applied to objects, integrity refers to the wholeness, intactness or purity of a thing—meanings that are sometimes carried over when it is applied to people." [2]. But in the case of the anthropological use of this

definition, the question arises about a person‘s qualities, which correspond to it. Is it a conditional person‘sphenotype that is the ideal realisation of the genotype? Or is it simply the inviolability of a citizen’s body in a state governed by the rule of law?

At the same time, in modern philosophy, the concept of integrity is mainly associated with the concepts of “the holistic,” “the systematic” and “the emergent.” For example, a holistic approach in social sciences requires viewing society as a whole, and therefore it is contrasted with an individualistic approach based on the study of a single person. Emergentcy is understood as a characteristic of a system whose state is determined by the balance between its autonomy as a whole and its dependence on the qualities of its individual parts.

In the interim conclusion, we can say that a whole person retains structural and functional integrity, which reflects the harmony among their physical, cognitive and social abilities. For example, a disabled person cannot be a world champion in running among healthy people, — the disables do not meet the anthropological standard of a human being accepted in society, but if they use sufficiently functional prostheses and their mobility is at the level of an ordinary person, they will be able to realise themselves professionaly, for example, as a turner, artist or an experimental scientist, that is, to achieve integrity.

In the current crisis of modernity, it is potentially possible to create the Other: both a gradually changed human being and a completely artificial intelligence, a technosubject, the latter puts the question of the division between anthropomorphic human beings and the sum of post-human beings. A technosubject is the Other because of the potential different integrity: the technogenic body of AI is a new techno-biological unity, in which, most likely, the psychophysical problem will be expressed quite differently, and consequently the problem of consciousness will be solved differently.

But the exact division between the technogenic subject and the human being in the context of the genetic modifications is a question, which is open to its solution. After all, the challenge to human integrity lies not only in the potential emergence of the techno-subject, the Other, but also in the possibility of becoming the Different, or approaching the existence of a technogenic individual. The question is to what extent it is possible to formulate positive criteria for integrity that are based not on the denial of the certain qualities, but on the performance of the certain functions by the individual, on human participation in certain cyclical social processes.

In applying the historical approach it is seen that human integrity is periodically challenged with the very development of civilisation. Each stage of civilisation’s development is a challenge that humanity must overcome, preserving itself on the basis of some new mechanisms for maintaining integrity.

The first challenge is the transfer of contradictions, which are the most significant in human development, into the sphere of human society. That is, the principles, by which the ordinary biological species are organized , that is the intraspecies struggle for existence being less important than with other living beings ,— have changed radically. Since then, humanity has regularly faced a ,social crisis, which must be overcome in order to develop further in many different ways. The basis for this new integrity is that fact that social changes have begun to outpace biological ones, and the destruction of collective

entities does not necessarily mean the death of the individuals who comprise them.

The second challenge is the emergence of the productive economy. Peasants adapted to their labour over centuries, ,and to abandon complex interaction with the surrounding nature means a lot in all considerations. To this purpose scientists mention—among others—a varied diet, transitioning to the consumption of a narrow set of crops, a sedentary lifestyle that contributed to the spread of diseases and opened up the possibility of exploitation [13]. At that time the solution to the problem was the creation of a complex natural economy with the necessary crop rotation, a set of cultivated plants, domestic animals, etc. As a result, the humanity achieved a new integrity: most people lived in the agrarian communities, in villages, and understood themselves within the cycles of the agrarian economy.

The third challenge is the emergence of modernity: the industrial revolution is combined with urbanisation and cultural changes. But this challenge has been only partially overcome. The reason is that up to now urbanisation has not achieved the reproduction of the urban population, and the single-child family type or more popular now free-child tendency lead to the demographic problems: social opportunities are present, but the physical opportunities for human reproduction may become unrealised, i.e. human integrity is disrupted. As a result, state structures must increase the expences for taking care of the individual life-being (free healthcare, free schooling, old-age pensions), and moreover, the addition of the problems of ethnic groups,– as a rule, refugees—(financial subsidies and protection of the ethnic human integrity as well as the development of biotechnology induced by computerisation, alledgebly , the preconditions for the potential disintegration of human integrity . They are as follows:

- removing people from the traditional conditions of production activities, for example, “dark workshops,” i.e. production facilities where lighting is not required because no people work there; from taditional military actions: the widespread use of drones can be seen as the beginning of the dehumanisation of the battlefield; and even from research activities, such as the creation of an autonomous chemical laboratories [15]. On the one hand, this removes people from the realm of major socio-economic conflicts; on the other,—it makes the use of people unnecessary. To paraphrase Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: if a human being is not a means to an end, then they cannot be an end in themselves;
- the collapse of the human reproduction cycle. From an anthropological point of view, many forms of biological selection have been eliminated (infant mortality is negligible), technologies for editing the genome have been created, not only in fertilised eggs, but also in fully-formed organisms. There is a significant demand for maternity surrogacy, and the creation of an artificial placenta will lead to changes in women’s reproductive behaviour. In the long term, this means that it will be biologically impossible for human beings to exist outside the technosphere;
- the loss of the total perception of the world and, as a result, a crisis in science and culture as systems that determine an individual’s worldview. AI already provides quick access to virtually any information and its

explanation in the simplest terms, which raises the issue of the function of teachers. The downside of this simplification is a reduced need for a holistic view of the world. Moreover, the creation of AI that is safe enough to raise children will further reduce the functions of the family.

To summarise these trends, the main challenge to human integrity is that that AI is being transformed from a tool into a full-fledged entity. On the one hand, it will have its merits in influencing human society, and; on the other hand, symbiotic interaction with the intellectual technosphere will become necessary to maintain human competitiveness.

It is supposed that there are two possible responses to this challenge: a) to embark on a race for rapid development, paying for it by means of anthropomorphism; however, this scenario, which is analysed as desirable by trans- and posthumanists, is not analysed in this work; b) to preserve anthropomorphism with the consequence of the loss of our position as the dominant species in the intellectual pyramid.

That is, people being possessors of natural intelligence, potentially become one of the intermediate links in the pyramid of intelligences of various origins. If, in the intellectual pyramid of the biosphere, human beings occupy the position of the most developed species and, accordingly, the superpredator, then in the presence of general AI and the intellectualisation of the technosphere, the question of the real position of human beings who continue to exist in the relatively stable, anthropic forms, becomes unprecedently acute. That is, humans will compete with various types of technosubjects for access to resources and control over technocenoses. The prototype of such competition can already be seen today: the development of neural networks requires a very large amount of electricity.

What, then, is the possibility for a person in the postmodernity who belongs to the ‘old‘ principle of modernity to reformulate the grounds for his/her own integrity?

There may be a similar situation when different ethnic groups face the overwhelming superiority of more developed states and try to formulate their methods of counteraction. Today, this direction is being studied within the framework of postcolonial philosophy [5]. The simplest way seems to dehumanise the Other. Indeed, opposing oneself to the Other as non-human object can create a basis for integrity, although by dehumanising one's opponent, a person may lose his own integrity as a human being if realisation in the struggle will be accompanied by intellectual degradation, for such opposition to continue, there must be an unquestionable struggle. An individual who has been literally grown up with a mobile phone may not be aware of such a conflict of interests. In addition, the separate problem in research of the human-robot interaction is the factor of robot anthropomorphism: researchers have not yet created a complete, universally accepted model, and the consequences of human interaction with such robots are very difficult to predict with confidence [3].

The next basis for integrity is the formation of the individual not in a biological sense but being fostered by culture. The starting point for the search for such integrity may be criticism of the expansion of certain models of understanding of ideas and images used in philosophy. Thus, in his work “Intellect and Spirit,” R. Negarestani criticises post-humanists for extending human

agency to flora and fauna , which means replicating the actions of humanists of the last century who tried to recognise the status of humans in all types of living things. Distancing himself from a simplified template of understanding humans, he writes about a method of self-reflection:

> *"When it is applied to objects, integrity refers to the wholeness, intactness or purity of a thing—meanings that are sometimes carried over when it is applied to people."* [12, P. 62]

In other words, reliance on history allows us to eliminate internal contradictions in our understanding of human beings.

Relying on the knowledge of the past eras should not be reduced to archiving ready-made answers. Here we can recall the image of Epimetheus, the brother of Prometheus, who in Greek mythology was the expression of reflective understanding, and this reflective knowledge could complement loss or missing knowledge. J. Kim, commenting on B. Stigler's work on the image of Epimetheus in the technical meaning, notes:

> "The act of understanding this forgotten knowledge becomes a delayed and postponed reaction, since the knowledge that people seek is initially devoid of ignorance. In the process of discovering this true ignorance, which is the initial forgotten knowledge, people achieve 'knowledge that arises from the accumulation of experience in the form of past mistakes.' This refers to 'reflexivity,' equivalent to Kantian reason, which includes human cognitive abilities, i.e., human consciousness. In accordance with these characteristics, the main function of consciousness may be reflective thinking to achieve forgotten knowledge, thereby creating the main source of memory in the process of cognition" [9, P. 44].

That is, when faced with puzzles and problems that they might not be able to be solved without AI, in the future people could borrow from the humanity history not only a set of answers, but also examples of how to deal with mistakes, uncertainty and mystery. And if those examples can allow to get rid of contradictions, they can also be the basis for human integrity.

In this context the question arises as for some realistic prerequisites for positive self-determination, the basis for integrity. The answers may be as follows.

A person is an example of the natural formation of intelligence, in which the sum of specific traits (i.e., individuality) achieves relative harmony with subjectivity (the manifestation of will and knowledge). General AI has the ability to quickly obtain large amounts of information, but copying data creates the problem of simultaneously developing individuality and his/hers goals. Thus, general AI can exist for some time in a certain virtual or augmented reality and mature in artificially created conditions. However, in the formation of an individual, a contradiction arises between the specifics of the virtual model used (it may be deliberately incorrect, created under the influence of political, economic or purely subjective factors) and its formation under the real conditions.

The benchmark of the psychophysical problem is a possible answer to it.. A human being is a model of a relatively stable biological body that is the carrier of an intelligent psyche. Meanwhile, AI can expand and narrow the set of controlled devices, i.e. its "body," and the consequences of such expansions are not obvious.

But if AI tries to recreate human culture, it needs human qualities, either in itself or in a model that it can use as a reference. In other words, human beings will remain the best combination of the object and the creator of cultural projects that existed before AI. Technosubjects will be able to create works of art, but the harmony between the creation and perception of models of human art requires human physicality.

One of the questions is why it happens in such a way. The first reason is: the diverse connection between phylogenesis and ontogenesis—the repetition of species development characteristics in an individual organism. The formation of intelligence and the emergence of the technogenic civilisation as sources of the existence of general AI must be analysed and evaluated for further development, no matter how advanced they may be. And each individual AI will face the problem of self-reflection in order to construct the necessary picture of the world:

> "Thus, I also believe that while being embodied and situated as being part of the world are crucial in some sense, the re-creation of the outer world in an inner image based on self-reflexive processes is the most central part in any project of developing an AGI." [11, P. 63]

The methods of this reproduction are reflected and developed partly within the limits of human knowledge—philosophy, psychology, etc.

The second prerequisite is that the General AI as an individual subject cannot fully know itself: complete self-reflection of the system at the moment of decision-making is impossible because it would require an infinite amount of computing power. This is one of the limitations that collective AI will not be able to overcome. Thus, the techno-subject also faces problems in analysing its own behaviour, the relationship between tasks and efforts is expended, which ultimately leads to the problem of the goal setting.

The third prerequisite states that AI as an individual subject has limits concerning its approximation to anthropomorphism. This does not mean that the human body cannot be copied in principle. But the technosubject will exist in a competitive environment that will require maximisation of its own cognitive capabilities. In such conditions, the complete copying the human brain as a carrier of intelligence is counterproductive.

Of course, cooperation is possible for techno-subjects, and just as a doctor knows the patient's state of health better than the patient himself, so service techno-subjects will be able to determine the goals of a particular general AI. But the problems of analysing the psyche, subjective motives, and the formation of preferences are very subtle issues that depend on manipulation and various aspects of competition between AIs, so they will require a certain model, a benchmark.

And this benchmark is a human being; of course, not as an individual with whom AI can consult about the meaning of its existence or conduct as an analogue of psychoanalytic sessions. Such a prediction would be speculative.

The advantages of natural intelligence cannot be vulgarised: people do not have a specific property or quality that allows them to monopolise any productive activity. Any skill, habit, or knowledge — taken on its own, outside of a complex — will be alienated in the context of technological progress: as a narrow specialist, AI will work and think better than human beings. And similarly achievement of full correspondence between the mathematical model and the human individual, the need for a biologically embodied model may disappear or be significantly reduced.

The contradiction that may determine the existence of human beings in their anthropic form is the contradiction between mimetic imitation, the borrowing of human behaviour available to the technosubject, and the analytical capabilities of general AI in understanding human intelligence.

The potential for mimetic imitation, in its turn, is expressed by the contradiction between the capabilities of an individual in its anthropic form and the set of all possible data from human history: a technosubject can either immerse itself in the study of the past or try to use a living individual or the current human society as a model for solving the tasks. The analytical capabilities of the technosubject, if it wants to use the experience of human history, give rise to their own contradiction between the possibility of self-reflection of general AI and the possibility of software emulation of an individual, i.e. a digital copy of a personality, in order to study it as a real person.

Here the problem is as follows: what could serve as a starting model, a kind of template for a new set of qualities that would keep a person whole?

The pivotal moment for humanity after technological singularity will be the period of independent development of humankind. The basis for human integrity after the creation of general AI is the integrity of the history of technological development and the existence of humankind, covering the period from the first tools to the emergence of technosubjects. At the first glance, such a long period may be the pivotal time. But the question is what practices and ethical norms the human being of the future may be able to borrow from the past eras.

For example, V. Jenkins, opposing the position of R. Nagarestani, describes the ethics of animist behaviour:

> "A wide array of moral, social, andpolitical practices are opened simply by suspending the conceit that only humansmay be persons. For ethics, inquiry along this line would significantly diversify research onperson-forming practices, cultures, traditions, and polities." [8, P. 629]

It is possible that some scientists can agree with such ethical attitudes of people who encounter the Others, especially when the Others demonstrate abilities comparable to those of human beings. "This does not mean a harmonious love for the quasi-divinity of all beings, but simply a richer set of interpersonal negotiations" [8, P. 629]. The emergence of the technogenic Other will raise questions not only about separation from it through the denial of relation-

ships, but also about the acquisition of human integrity through cooperation with the Other.

From the point of view of AI in general, human beings are an integral actor in the history of the formation of the technosubject. They are the parent species of intelligent beings, the bearer of "natural intelligence" without which the formation of the next species of intelligent beings could not have taken place.

But it is not simple to understand the correspondence of a person to a particular period of history on the whole. On the one hand, it is an opportunity to view it as the whole, as the genesis of his/her own society and the way of thinking; on the other hand, it is an opportunity to relate oneself to each of stages. Men can relate themselves to people in the Neolithic era and to human beings in the computer revolution. Such a correlation of oneself with the past does not mean that a person could be able to survive in the desert like a primitive hunter or plough the land like a peasant. However, it is impossible to empathise with and sympathise with people of the past eras when one has fundamentally different physical abilities, or when one does not have the ability to create a set of senses, a sensorium, that would be equivalent to the human body. It is impossible to understand their hopes without imagining the history, problems and prospects of the definite past era.

This leads to the need to solve the post-singular problems of humanity in general or of the individual in particular, using the techniques, methods of thinking, ethical norms, precedents and models of behaviour that were given in the axial age, not by copying them literally, but by considering them as elements of human development. In other words, overcoming the contradictions that existed in history independently can be perceived through the prism of dialectics, through their removal, or through the prism of religious knowledge, through revelation, synergy, acceptance of the new truth, or through any scientific discipline—economics, medicine, etc.

But another way of thinking transforms the anthropic human being into either a non-historical individual, in fact a savage, who is even more vulnerable to competing AIs, or a human-machine symbiont, in which people consciously refuse to use a holistic picture of the world and make completely independent decisions.

The question is: in what form the existence of a person can be represented who, on the one hand, has lost control over the technosphere, and on the other,—considers themself a model of people from the axial age? This does not mean that people will remain only in museums. Rather, it is possible to describe the spectrum of human manifestations from purely archival data sets to real societies:

- a complex of ideas, as well as historical records and artefacts, the sum of which can be called a static reflection of the history of human civilization, its integrity is the integrity of the body of historical sources;
- research into this complex, comparing the subject with the axial time, which requires the creation of dynamic models that will replay history over and over again, taking into account new data, moreover, such models should be used as both anthropomorphic humans and technosubjects;
- a physically existing individual, a person who is necessary for technogenic civilisation as a benchmark for the development of natural intelligence,

but who also has their own needs. At the same time, the possibilities for reproduction and preservation of the organism and psyche will improve qualitatively. The difference between a real, physically existing human being and their purely virtual model will be the main factor in the interaction of post-human beings with real people. The constant reproduction of an individual subject who relates himself to the period of independent human history, trying to use the behavioural models and concepts of that era to comprehend their life in fact the cycle of existence of a post-singular individual.

Existing families and societies, which are partially supported by the state or its forms that have survived after technological singularity, would perform rudimentary functions in the technosphere, support themselves, and at the same time they are forced to compete for resources with various forms of technosubjects. It is likely that individuals in these societies will be able to realise themselves physically, cognitively and socially, while maintaining structural and functional integrity. For such societies, the contradiction between human culture and their need to adapt to the envitonment becomes relevant. As a result, the integrity of such societies will be under constant threat, just as the integrity of the peasant community was under threat.

Scientific novelty

The author asserts that the research of the foundations of human integrity is based on the understanding of human history as a separate stage in the development of intelligent beings. It is proved scientifically that the period of history from the beginning of tools making to technological singularity can be a pivotal time for future generations of human beings to retain anthropomorphism. The article demonstrates that the human individual has a set of qualities that technosubjects do not possess at the present time. The qualities, which are connected with the human intellectuality can remain in demand as a model of intellectual development for technosubjects.

Conclusions

The analysis shows that the integrity of the human being went into the question during every crisis of civilisation and the renewed foundations of integrity were formulated and implemented in the process of overcoming crisises.

The elimination of integrity in the comprehension of man is used as one of the tools in transhumanism and posthumanism for creating new forms of subjects, which, in its turn, is perceived as a means of maintaining the competitiveness of subjects of anthropic genesis, or as a prerequisite for the creation of fundamentally new intelligent beings.

However, this does not exclude the possibility of considering the integrity of the post-singular human beings who will potentially retain their anthropic form despite the accelerated development of technology. Presumably, in the case of the creation of general AI, they will be given a part of the control function in the economy and public administration. The influence of human beings on the technosphere will decrease qualitatively, and this will likely lead to a

decline in the role of the economy and science as systems that unite humanity. And under the influence of more developed intelectuality what reason would people have to consider themselves a single society or species of living beings? Why should they not consider their human neighbours to be non-human Others?

These reasons can be divided into two components:

a) those functions that human beings will continue to perform and which ensure their integrity, e.g., an ecological niche, ensures the integrity of the biological species that exist within it. In particular, people retain their significance as the standard of the psychophysical aspect (the body of general AI will probably be able to radically change its configuration), as well as the standard of the natural formation of intelligence, in which the sum of specific characteristics (i.e., individuality) achieves relative harmony with subjectivity (the manifestation of will and knowledge);

b) the cycles of reproduction of the culture of individuals, which will be based on the axial time. In its capacity, it is worth considering the entire period of independent existence of humanity as the existence of the intelligent species. Refusing to comform to the problems and values of the axial time will transform the anthropic human being either into a savage devoid of history, who is even more vulnerable to competing AIs wishing to use them as a resource, or into a human-machine symbiont, in which the human being consciously refuses to use a holistic picture of the world and is not able of independent decision-making.

However, these grounds are not absolute and may also be called into question as a result of the technological development, e.g., in case if a complete digital copy of the individual is created in the virtual reality that is indistinguishable from the human subject.

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